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THE STORY IN BRIEF In the sprmg of 1992 several U S commercial aerospace contractors informed the U S Department of State (DOS) that Italy, Spain, and Australia were independently mltlatmg small space launch vehicle (SLV) programs Furthermore, that these counvles wanted the assistance of U S aerospace contractors to build these SLVs Thus, the contractors desired U S government approval to assist these countries bmld then unrelated mdlgenous SLV programs Over the period from Apnl to December 1992 U S contractors followed up their mqulnes by filing 14 speclflc export license requests with the DOS, Defense
Trade Center (DTC) These export license requests were for the sale of hardware, technology, and services, to support the SLV programs m these countries U S contractors subnutted these license requests with the knowledge that existing U S national security and foreign pohcy prohibited U S firms from supportmg the development of foreign SLV programs In accordance with standard procedures, the DTC referred these SLV export requests to a formal interagency workmg group estabhshed to approve or deny all rocket related exports from the Umted States
For six months this interagency group struggled to reach a consensus on these export cases but remamed deadlocked One faction led by the Department of Defense (DOD) advocated denial of the export licenses based on exlstmg pohcy and another faction led by DOS argued for a change m pohcy and approval of the licenses By December it was clear that neither side would yield and the issue was rased to the National Security Council (NSC) However, the battle lines were drawn and m the context of the 1990 Gulf War SCUD missile attacks, and the rmsslle prohferatlon threat, the NSC was unable to reach a consensus decision The issue was decided the night of 19 January 1993 by President Bush m the White House pnvate residence * On 20
January 1993, the NSC recorded the approval of the entire slate of export cases for these three specific SLV programs as the last act of the Bush Admmlstratlon In approvmg these exports, the President reversed the long standmg U S pohcy agamst support of SLV programs m foreign countries Exammmg the reason why and how this change m U S SLV pohcy took place provides a case study m the U S interagency bureaucratic pohcy makmg process This essay chronicles an SLV pohcy shift resulting from the struggle to balance two components of the pohcy triangle of U S national secunty pohcy, foreign pohcy, and economc pohcy It concludes that the near term polmcal foreign pohcy desire to mamtam good relations with mtematlonal friends and allies will often take precedence over rational but nebulous long term national secunty threats To weave this story I will fu-st review the background of U S pohcy prohlbltmg support of foreign SLV programs, and second, I ~111 review why and how this pohcy was modified m 1992-1993 Lastly, the conclusion offers some possible lessons for future bureaucratic pohcy decision makers BACKGROUND Understandmg U S pohcy toward foreign SLV programs and why the DOD objected to a shift m this pohcy, begins with the post WW II prohferatlon of nuclear weapons Second, from this nuclear starting point, and the utility of couplmg these weapons with and China However, all nation-states realized the lmphcatlons of nuclear weapons for national power By the rmd 1960's, nuclear prohferatlon was a concern for the U S , USSR, and then By the end of the Gulf War, MTCR membership had grown from its orlgmal seven members (the Umted States, United Kmgdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada) to 18 countries with four addmonal countnes (Russia, Switzerland, Israel, and China) agreeing to abide by the MTCR Guidelines * These Guldelrnes expressed the objective of the MTCR, to prevent the proliferation of any rmsslle capable of dehvermg a 300 Kg payload a distance of 500 Km 9 Here a "n-usslle" 1s any rocket with the above capablhtles, mcludmg SLVs However, the MTCR also states that it 1s "not deslgned to impede national space programs or mtematlonal cooperation m such programs as long as such programs could not contibute to nuclear weapons delivery systems "lo In a 1993 RAND study on Emergmg National Space Launch Programs, the author draws the followmg conclusion on space launch programs "Smce (m light of the MTCR) it 1s difficult to argue that space launch programs 'could not contribute to nuclear weapons dehvery systems,' namely balhstlc rmsslles, Should the United States provide techmcal assistance to a space launch program, d the recipient country promises to forgo its balhstlc nusslle program? We don't think so We also find it Important to Inform top government officials of the direct connection between a space launch program and a ballistic nusslle program Ironically, a sequential strategy --space launch program first, balhstlc nusslle development later --nught turn out to be the best tactic (to obtain offensive rmsslles) "I1
With ee Iraq1 Scud attacks durmg the Gulf War the MTCR underwent an additional change. It became apparent that rogue states such as Iraq, were not averse to using chemical weapons" Washington D C Also, these officers belreved that d the cases were approved the programs would die of then own weight anyway smce they could not possibly be cost effective.
